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ABSTRACT: At last year’s BRIMS conference, we described a model of mental simulation based on statistical event 
prediction (Kunde and Darken, 2005).  In this paper, we describe a new decision-making architecture based on our 
mental simulation model.  We have developed and tested the model using a scenario built in COMBAT XXI, where the 
model is used to make fire/hold fire decisions.  While the choice of what is to be predicted and the basis for the predic-
tion are chosen by a human modeler, the details of the predictive models are constructed by machine learning based on 
actual simulation data. Three different predictive models are used to support the decision, one for target richness, one 
for the effects of obscuring terrain, and one for losses.  The outputs of the predictions are integrated by a decision com-
ponent, which is currently implemented by a decision tree. Preliminary experimental results indicate that the predictive 





For many years now, models of naturalistic decision mak-
ing have inspired insightful analyses of human and hu-
man/machine systems, leading to improvements in human 
interface and overall system design (Klein et. al. 2003, 
Miller, 2005, NDM, 2005). The most well-known natural-
istic decision making theory is arguably Gary Klein's 
Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) model (Klein, 
1999).  We are very interested in models like RPD and 
what they imply for how realistic human behavior repre-
sentations for simulations could function.  In particular, 
our research has focused on a salient component of the 
RPD model, mental simulation.  In brief, mental simula-
tion is the human ability to anticipate the consequences of 
courses of action in order to select the best one. We have 
previously advanced a model of mental simulation based 
on statistical event prediction (Kunde and Darken, 2005). 
In this paper, we describe how this mental simulation 
model can be incorporated into a complete architecture 
for decision making.   
 
We have developed a decision-making architecture as a 
framework for applying mental simulation in a combat 
simulation environment. This approach, based on statisti-
cal models, shows that simulated entities that are capable 
of “looking ahead” into the near future perform more real-
istically than those that do not include knowledge of the 
past, but only use information from the present (Kunde, 
2005). The look ahead consists of the prediction of likely 
next events over various time scales.  Our implementation 
of a mental simulation component projects the past into 
the future using no more than three variables like people 
usually do (Klein, 1999). In the case of the example ap-
plication considered here, the predicted events include 
changes in the target richness of the environment and the 
impact of the terrain in the near future. Losses for friendly 
and opposing forces over a somewhat longer period of 
time are also predicted. We consider the resulting behav-
ior “more realistic” because the entities reason and have 
expectations about a larger number of relevant factors, are 
able to adjust to sudden changes in the environment (e.g. 
react to an enemy that is currently not visible), and are 
able to use information or knowledge gained during a 
considered period, that is, a simulation run. Knowledge 
gain, also called learning, improves the overall perform-
ance of the software agent.  
 
In the next sections of the paper we put our work in the 
context of other ongoing efforts and describe the devel-
oped architecture for our mental simulation model. In the 
subsequent sections we show in detail how we approach 
  
the empirical terrain evaluation and how the model actu-
ally renders the decisions. In closing we compare the be-
havior of the model to that of human subjects in a pre-
liminary experiment. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
To date, researchers have made the following attempts to 
model recognition-primed decision-making. The work 
closest to this project was done by Sokolowski (2002). He 
implemented a model for the recognition-primed deci-
sion-making of a Joint Task Force commander in an op-
erational military scenario using a multi agent system 
approach. With this computational system, Sokolowski 
could mimic the cognitive process. However, he didn’t 
focus on mental simulation and stated specifically that 
“the mental-simulation process will most likely need to be 
enhanced to better replicate the role of mental simulation 
within RPD” (Sokolowski, 2002). Warwick et al., (2001) 
approached their modeling of RPD by encoding the long-
term memory (LTM) of decision makers. They modeled 
LTM in a data structure by storing individual decision-
making experiences as a two-dimensional array. When 
new situations occur, they are compared with experiences 
stored in the LTM. Computing a “similarity value” yields 
a measure of comparability in order to recognize a usable 
experience and the appropriate course of action. Although 
it seems to show promise as a model of parts of RPD, the 
mental simulation part has yet to be designed (Warwick, 
2002). 
 
3. The Architecture  
 
The general framework of the model developed is de-
picted in Figure 1. The entire system consists of four 
components: the environment, which covers mainly the 
simulation system, the situational awareness component, 
which ensures an up-to-date situational picture at the de-
cision time, the mental simulator, which predicts and as-
sesses, and the decision component, which evaluates the 
influencing factors and actually renders the decision. 
 
3.1 Example Scenario 
 
In order to conduct experiments and to present results we 
designed an example scenario with two modifications 
which is a further development of the scenario used last 
year (Kunde and Darken, 2005).  
The forces depicted in the simulation were a blue and a 
red tank platoon. The red tanks would always start out 
following a predetermined path through blue’s kill zone, 
but would attempt to flank blue’s position if blue revealed 
himself too early. Only blue used our decision-making 
architecture.  Red’s behavior was generated in a relatively 









































































































































































Figure 1. The general architecture. 
 
3.2 Simulation Environment 
 
The simulation environment is the driving component. It 
contains the simulation system that can run on the same 
computer or can be networked. For the general use it does 
not matter, as long as the output of the system contains 
the required data for the other components. That sounds 
totally obvious, however this is not always the case and 
the simulation system might need to be adjusted. One 
occurrence of that case could be related to the way detec-
tions are handled in a combat simulation system. The tar-
get acquisition algorithms yield detections of entities, but 
in contrast to a human observer on the battlefield they 
normally do not provide the event when a spotted unit 
goes out of sight. This can only be deduced when in the 
next observation-sweep the specific entity does not show 
up on the “detection list” any more. But then it is still 
unknown at what specific time and at what specific loca-
tion this occurred. Another consideration could be the 
case in which aggregated units are used. The attrition of 
aggregated units is normally computed by Lanchester 
Equations. The target detection and acquisition does not 
provide information about individual tanks. There exist 
combat simulation models where the resolution is not on 
the entity level, like in Vector in Commander (VIC, 
2005). That does not exclude aggregated models from 
being used in this research. However, the decision-
making process will not be more detailed than the 
model’s resolution level.  
 
3.3 Situational Awareness Component 
 
The situational awareness component takes the output of 
the simulation and builds up its own internal perception of 
the world (Sutton and Barto, 1981). For our ground com-
bat scenario, it creates estimates about the enemy forma-
tions, speed and directions. The situation awareness com-
  
ponent exists to provide the mental simulator with a de-
scription of the current situation (Kunde and Darken, 
2005). If the mental simulator is actively learning its pre-
dictive model, the percepts/observations necessary for 
training the model are also sent to the mental simulator. If 
there is a finished predictive model pre-loaded, only an 
update of the current situation would occur. In the abstract 
view of Figure 1, the situational awareness component is 
not limited to ground combat situations alone. It is appli-
cable to all cases of simulation where a more sophisti-
cated awareness is required than is directly available from 
the simulation system. This might include appropriate 
knowledge in a 3D-environment about the value, benefit, 
or meaning that “people” seen in the virtual environment 
have due to their spatial relationships. This might mean to 
know that I can watch a certain portion of a building and 
others see a different portion, but overall I know what 
portion of the building in total can be surveyed. 
 
3.4 Mental Simulator 
 
The mental simulator, the central component of the archi-
tecture, makes the difference between our simulation sys-
tem and all other combat simulation systems. It uses the 
knowledge gained in the past, predicts the next probable 
event, puts this estimated event into the context of the 
anticipated situation and has knowledge about potential 
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Figure 2. Detail of the mental simulator as applied to 
our test scenario. 
A detailed view of the mental simulator as applied to the 
fire/hold fire decision is depicted in Figure 2. The circled 
numbers in the figure depict the three predictors contained 
in this component: 
1. To retrieve a context from the situational aware-
ness component, and to estimate the next probable 
observation and the average (typically we use the 
median) time when this event will occur (Kunde, 
2005);  
2. To predict the terrain quality in the near future; and 
3. To create potential actions and estimate their out-
comes. 
Each predictor has a model structure chosen by a human 
modeler with internal parameters that are populated in a 
machine learning process based on simulation data.  The 
learning process represents the prior experience of the 
blue commander.  While in principle additional learning 
could occur concurrently with the active use (record runs) 
of the model, for experimental convenience learning was 
done off-line on special simulation runs designed to 
maximize learning. 
Predictor 1 
The context binds the variables of the maximum number 
of tanks per formation and determines whether, for the 
upcoming decisions, several formations are currently ob-
served. In the case of an observation of tanks from multi-
ple formations, the one that is the greatest threat is se-
lected to engage first. In the current implementation, the 
threat is proportional to the distance, which is part of the 
provided context. There is also a need to assess whether 
the red tanks can detect the blue tanks. This assessment 
can’t be done due to model deficiencies in the test bed.. 
The decision component later on decides on the threat 
evaluation done in the mental simulator. The predictive 
model we used for this scenario is a Markov Chain. In 
order to ensure that events with a lower probability will 
also sometimes be predicted we used a Monte Carlo simu-
lation for sampling the values from the probability distri-
bution as estimates (Kunde and Darken, 2005). 
Predictor 2 
In the test bed, Combat XXI, we used detections that were 
determined with the ACQUIRE algorithm (see next sec-
tion). We model the likelihood that a tank will go out of 
sight in the near future by examining the terrain empiri-
cally in a preprocess. This extends the terrain considera-
tion beyond merely having a line-of-sight feature. The 
ACQUIRE algorithm uses various parameters to deter-
mine whether a specific sensor detects a specific target. In 
extension to that our model, the terrain assessment given 
the presence of a line-of-sight, enables entities to estimate 
how likely it will be to detect a target in a certain terrain 
before the target actually arrives. To a certain degree, that 
ability to predict likelihood, or probability, mimics the 
anticipation of “undetection.” This capability is important 
when modeling, for example, the behavior of human tank 
gunners in a “duel” situation, in which they monitor tar-
gets before shooting them. In known constructive combat 
simulation environments to date, it is not implemented to 
consider how long the target might be visible, since the 
observations occur in a manner similar to a radar sweep of 
a certain sector (see 4.1). But with the terrain assessment 
performed in our model, an agent can anticipate when 
targets will go out of sight and take appropriate action, 
  
rather than the agent simply recognizing eventually that 
the targets are gone. 
Predictor 3 
The mental simulator is also tasked to create potential 
actions. The current implementation is coded to create 
two potential actions: 1) to initiate the firing process as 
soon as a target becomes visible on the battlefield and 2) 
not to start engagement, respectively to hold fire until the 
next observation occurs.  
In case 1, the risk of outflanking arises and the likelihood 
the likelihood of not seeing all tanks increases. In case 2, 
when all or most of the red tanks are visible, the likeli-
hood that they will try to outflank the blue tanks is rela-
tively small. In a real-world situation, they would most 
probably move in ways to avoid cross-movements relative 
to the enemy, and try to engage as quickly as possible. In 
Combat XXI, these two actions were simulated with the 
Run Manager, and the output was determined with respect 
to blue losses, red losses, and the “starting state,” which is 
the number of red tanks seen in the first observation. 
 
3.5 Decision Component 
In the current implementation, the decision component 
requires three inputs:  
- a prediction of the next event likely to occur 
(predicted change in target richness),  
- an assessment of the prediction with respect to 
expected terrain influence, and 
- an assessment of the likely blue and red losses 
given each possible action.  
In other words, the decision component takes the pre-
dicted number of tanks to see in the next observation, 
retrieves a median time for this event to occur, and esti-
mates the expected location of the tanks to be seen. The 
new location estimate is calculated geometrically based 
on the estimated speed and direction. For this estimated 
location there is a terrain cell attribute that indicates how 
likely it is that an observation will occur in this location. 
The terrain cell attribute is defined in terms of the number 
of detections in a preliminary run. The terrain attribute, 
explained in 4.2, will be used to assess the prediction. The 
probable blue and red losses for each possible action are 
retrieved from the database. In preliminary runs in similar 
scenarios, the dependence of losses on whether the pla-
toon fired immediately or delayed the firing and also on 
the number of tanks seen in the initial observation was 
determined. 
In a real combat environment, a commander observing a 
tank can continue to look at the tank as long as the same 
line of sight also continues. Seeing the movement of the 
tank or anticipating the path in the future, he can deter-
mine that the tank might go out of sight in a certain 
amount of time given obstacles, terrain features, etc. He 
can determine a certain amount of wait time in which he 
has to fire before he “loses” the target. Contrary to that is 
the situation in a constructive simulation environment. 
There are events at a particular point in time that deter-
mine that certain detections have been made. But, in gen-
eral, there is not information available as to how long the 
observed entities will be visible. Although in some cases 
the system developers accepted that there is a need also 
for undetection information, no such implementation has 
yet been accomplished. Therefore, we developed a 
method to get information as to when a tank would 
probably go out of sight. This can be seen as an upper 
bound on how long to wait until the enemy tank is en-
gaged in order to enrich the environment with targets and 
to avoid that the currently undetected members of the 
formation change their path.  
  
4 Empirical Terrain Assessment 
 
A novel aspect of our model is that our decision making 
model is provided with an empirical assessment of the 
impact of terrain on the continued visibility of the targets.  
By “empirical” we mean that the terrain judgments are 
not based directly on the ground truth about the terrain, 
but are instead based on experience. 
 
4.1 ACQUIRE Algorithm 
 
The U.S. Army’s current standard algorithm for target 
acquisition is the ACQUIRE model. The ACQUIRE algo-
rithm is a common search-and-target-acquisition algo-
rithm used in many army force-on-force models (Cioppa 
et al., 2003). The ACQUIRE algorithm predicts target 
acquisition performance for imaging systems that operate 
in the visible, near-infrared, and infrared spectral bands. 
Therefore, it covers all sensors that occur in our currently 
implemented scenarios. According to the user’s guide, the 
ACQUIRE algorithm 
predicts the expected proportion of an ensemble 
of trained military observers who can discrimi-
nate a target of a given size and temperature dif-
ference with the background, under specified 
atmospheric conditions (ACQUIRE Range Per-
formance Model for Target Acquisition Sys-
tems, 1995). 
The ACQUIRE algorithm uses a Field of View (FoV) and 
a Field of Regard (FoR) nomenclature. Field of View is 
the horizontal and vertical angle that the sensor looks at, 
plus a scaling factor that is not of further interest to our 
simulation. The ACQUIRE algorithm is applied inde-
pendently for each FoV. Before a FoV can be revisited, 
the entire Field of Regard must have been scanned: thus, 
the bigger the number of FoVs per FoR, the longer it is 
before any one FoV can be revisited. 
  
4.2 Terrain Attributes 
 
We introduced the term terrain attributes. A terrain attrib-
ute is an index that determines whether a particular terrain 
cell can be categorized as having either a “good” or a 
“bad” rate of detectability. Our terrain of interest, that is, 
the site where we expect decisions to occur, is divided 
into 100 x 100 m cells. In each cell, approximately four to 
six tanks were randomly distributed. No entity (i.e., tank) 
was moving, but the target acquisition algorithm was 
made active. Then the simulation is turned on and the 
detections, which occur over time, are recorded. The 
graph in Figure 3 shows how the detections in a particular 
repetition occurred over time. It can be seen that the 
longer the scan time the more tanks get detected. To de-
termine a reasonable cell attribute, we conducted 50 runs 
of the combat simulation model with a scan time that was 
similar to the actual simulation run. In our scenario we 
had scan times per FoV that were normal distributed over 
a mean of 3.5 seconds.  
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Figure 3. Total detections over time. 
Figure 4 depicts one example of the terrain assessment: 
the cell with the coordinates (59200, 23100), which con-
tains six tanks. Their numbers are listed at the right. The 
ACQUIRE algorithm detected only one tank. A cell was 
attributed as “good,” in terms of its detectability, when 
more than 50 percent of its tanks were detected. In this 






















Figure 4.  The determination of terrain attributes   
  
Since the detection is stochastic, the attributes for the ter-
rain cells are aggregated. Figure 5 shows the variation 
among various runs. 
 
 
Figure 5. Variation in the number of tanks detected 
over 25 runs.  
A terrain attribute also depends on the location of both the 
observer and the target. In our example, none of the tanks, 
including the observer’s is moving over the course of a 
single run. Therefore, we also conducted several runs in 
which the target tanks randomly changed position within 
their 100 x 100 m cells. The number of tanks per cell, 
however, was kept constant. The mean of the six runs 
conducted was forty-seven detected tanks, plus or minus 
seven tanks, in a 1.4 x 1.4 km square. The number of cells 
containing tanks and having line of sight to the observer 
tanks is 121. Thus, the variation per cell is in average less 
than half a tank. A terrain cell earned the attribute “good,” 
indicated by green in Figure 4 , when in 90% of the cases 
half or more of the tanks were detected. In all other cases 
the terrain cells were attributed as “bad.” When there was 
no detection at all, the cell was colored dark gray; in the 
remaining cases, light gray. 
  
We also evaluated how well this approach performs. In 
order to do so, we looked at 10 replications of a single 
scenario involving a group of moving hostile tanks. We 
examined all consecutive observations that had a change 
of terrain cell attributes associated with them. That means, 
when an observation i occurred in a “good” terrain cell 
and the observation i+1 occurred in a “bad” terrain cell 
then the number of tanks in each observation are re-
corded. This was done in the same way when the terrain 
cell attribute change occurred from “bad” to “good.” 
When no change occurred, nothing was recorded. At the 
end of the scenario replications the mean values for 
changes from “good” to “bad” and from “bad” to “good“ 
were determined and put into Figure 6. This figure dis-
plays the mean values of differences in number of tanks 









































































































Figure 6. Changes in number of tanks observed 
around a terrain cell attribute change 
Above the zero line are the values for changes from “bad” 
to “good” and below vice versa. It is apparent that all 
means are either above or below the zero line indicating 
that it can be assumed when going, for example, from a 
“good” to a “bad” terrain cell in average less tanks can be 
expected in the next observations. We then also truncated 
the data (due to space constraints not displayed). Trunca-
tion was done when the first damage occurred. The result-
ing chart showed more clearly the difference between 
good and bad terrain cells because the maximum number 
of tanks observable decreases after damage occurred.  
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Figure 7. Decision Tree 
In our basic initial example of an agent, a tank platoon 
commander, the tank decides to fire according to the deci-
sion tree in Figure 7. Once a tank is in view, this decision 
tree gets activated because there is a need for a decision. 
The decision component proceeds downwards through the 
tree until it hits a node that says “fire” or “hold fire.” At 
each node a condition is checked and based on the out-
come of this condition the respective path is chosen.  
The top node evaluates the threat level of the tanks ob-
served to the blue (friendly) tank platoon where leader’s 
decision process is being modeled. Determination of 
threat level is based on range in the current implementa-
tion. Other potential factors could include the heading of 
the tank or whether the enemy gun points towards the 
blue position. Our handling of threat assumes that the blue 
tanks are in a turret-down or hull-down position, in which 
the probability of detection is relatively small. The threat 
level might also be influenced by the mission, not only by 
the risk of being shot at. A good example would be a mis-
sion of suppression of enemy reconnaissance. Even if the 
enemy tank does not detect the blue position it can still be 
a severe threat, because of the capability of reporting re-
connaissance results that might endanger blue’s own op-
eration. The heading of the enemy tank’s gun cannot cur-
rently be retrieved in Combat XXI. Therefore, it is not 
modeled. However, clearly determination of a threat can 
be based on various parameters. If an immediate threat is 
assessed, that is the enemy comes within a certain thresh-
old distance, then the tank immediately starts the en-
gagement process to prevent being shot themselves (path 
9 in Figure 7). Otherwise a hierarchical approach in the 
decision tree is further pursued. 
In the next two layers of the tree, the prediction of how 
many tanks will most likely be seen in the next observa-
tions is used. If the prediction will be at most the same 
number of tanks as currently seen and this value exceeds 
50% of the estimated platoon size then the engagement 
process is also initiated. This rule captures the case where 
currently three or four out of four tanks possible are ob-
served and it is unlikely to see more in the next observa-
tion. Therefore, firing at the ones observed would be a 
reason-able thing to do. For the case that currently only 
two tanks out of four are observed, the terrain is addition-
ally assessed, and in case of a good detectability of the 
future terrain cell the casualty evaluation is conducted, 
otherwise the engagement starts. If the casualty evaluation 
is promising then fire is on hold, otherwise also the en-
gagement process starts immediately (cases g - j in 
Figure 7).   
If the prediction indicates a higher number of tanks than 
currently observed, then the expected percentage of the 
estimated current platoon size the tank commander will 
see is determined. This captures the situation when, for 
example, a platoon has five tanks and four tanks are seen 
and the system actually starts firing at them (case fin 
Figure 7).  
If the number of enemy tanks currently observed is less 
than the maximum number possible, for example two in 
our example, then the terrain evaluation triggers the en-
gagement process. If good detectability is anticipated, the 
model holds fire (case c in Figure 7). If poor detectabil-
ity is anticipated, the model assesses the casualties 
  
evaluation from preliminary runs. If the casualty evalua-
tion indicates fewer losses when waiting to fire then the 
model holds fire, otherwise it fires (cases d and e in 
Figure 7). 
These factors enable the simulated platoon commander to 
make better decisions. The decision tree and the condi-
tions were discussed with officers from the armor branch 
of several countries represented at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. In existing models, inappropriate immediate fir-
ing remains unpunished because the attacker also be-
haves inappropriately, ignoring the first shot or even a 
resulting kill and continuing to follow the scripted path. 
The decision component also creates the explanatory 
component of the system. This means it provides a text 
string from which the user can see why decisions made by 
the model turned out the way they did; making the ration-
ale transparent to the user. There are no anonymous num-
bers that lead to a decision. All numbers used have a 
meaning in terms of losses, time or probabilities. There-





We conducted four experiments. They all used the same 
general Combat XXI scenario. The first experiment ad-
dressed the question of whether there would be a differ-
ence in prediction accuracy as a function of the number of 
state machines. This is a more technical experiment and 
was used to make design decisions. We describe in the 
following those experiments conducted with military offi-
cers from various services at the Naval Postgraduate 
School. The number of human participants varied be-
tween 6 and 11. The next experiment (No. 2) compared 
the prediction accuracy of the model to that of humans. 
Human participants observed the simulation screen and 
were asked to predict how many tanks will be detected in 
the next observation cycle. They were provided as tools 
graphical representations of the information used by the 
program: the Markov Chain, terrain attributes, and esti-
mated outcomes (losses) from potential firing. This and 
the next experiment address the model’s validity by com-
paring its performance to human performance. The third 
experiment examined how the tools, provided to the par-
ticipants and mandatory for the model to work, impact the 
human predictions. The fourth experiment compared the 
firing behavior from humans and the model based on ex-





7.1 Prediction Behavior 
 
The prediction behavior was examined in experiment 2 
and 3. Figure 8 displays the results from experiment 2. 
Figure 9 displays the results from experiment 3. The task 
was similar to experiment 2 with the twist that in the first 
four replications, no tools were provided. In the second 
four replications all tools were provided. The participants 














Figure 8. Results from experiment 2 
The analysis of the data collected was done in terms of 
how often the prediction was correct. This was assessed 
again only for the first prediction of each replication and 
for all common number of predictions. The mental simu-




final4.xml_REP6 2 4 0.33 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP7 3 3 0.50 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP8 4 2 0.67 1 1 0.50
final4.xml_REP9 5 1 0.83 1 1 0.50
mean 0.58 mean 0.75
final4.xml_REP6MOD 4 2 0.67 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP7MOD 4 2 0.67 1 1 0.50
final4.xml_REP8MOD 5 0 1.00 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP9MOD 5 1 0.83 1 1 0.50
mean 0.79 mean 0.75
Sdev above 0.22 Sdev above 0.29
Sdev below 0.16 Sdev below 0.29
Scenario
ratio ratio
final4.xml_REP6 9 16 0.36 6 4 0.60
final4.xml_REP7 3 3 0.50 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP8 4 2 0.67 1 1 0.50
final4.xml_REP9 5 1 0.83 1 1 0.50
mean 0.59 mean 0.65
final4.xml_REP6MOD 10 7 0.59 5 1 0.83
final4.xml_REP7MOD 7 4 0.64 1 3 0.25
final4.xml_REP8MOD 6 0 1.00 2 0 1.00
final4.xml_REP9MOD 5 1 0.83 1 1 0.50
mean 0.76 mean 0.65
Sdev above 0.21 Sdev above 0.24
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Figure 9. Results from the experiments for comparing 
prediction accuracy. 
 
7.2 Firing Behavior 
 
 This experiment uses the data collected in experiments 2 
and 3. There, the participants predicted the next observa-
tion and decided to fire when an observation sequence 
met their individual criteria for a firing decision. In ex-
periments 2 and 3 the model did not make any firing deci-
sions. The participants were not influenced by the mental 
simulation model’s behavior. In experiment 4, the model 
decided to fire according to a particular path through the 
decision tree. Figure 10 displays the results from the fir-
ing comparison quantitatively for the scenario final4. The 
x-axis denotes the various replications of the scenario 
“final4.” The left four replications denote the runs without 
  
tools for the participants and the right four replications 
with the tools provided. The y-axis indicates at what ob-
servation the human participants fired on average and in 
addition when the model fired. In the right four replica-
tions one can argue that the humans with the tools basi-
cally mimic the model’s algorithm. However, then the left 
data points, REP_7 to REP_9, are harder to explain since 
the tools were not available to the human participants at 
that time. The first data point, REP_6 is explainable simi-
larly to the prediction experiment. Having no information 
about transition probabilities and terrain cell attributes 
makes it hard to decide when to fire. Furthermore, espe-
cially Army participants applied their knowledge of a map 
this scale to their decision making process without con-
sidering that this knowledge is not incorporated in the 
combat simulation system. Except for the first data point, 
all decisions of the model to fire are within one standard 
deviation of the human participants’ mean displayed as a 
yellow hyphened line. 
Model vs. Humans








































































































Figure 10. The firing behavior is similar between hu-
man participants and the model. Without tools the 
human participants are off in the beginning but rather 
quickly adjust their behavior. 
The results show that not only the predictions but also the 
firing decisions perform in the human range. It is obvious 
that the model never immediately fired the moment a tar-
get popped up. Neither did the human participants. For 
those replications where the humans fired later or early 
the model decided similarly. Note that the results from the 
experiment were not used to calibrate the model, and the 
decision tree was developed independent of the results 
from the human participants. However, human tank ex-
perts were considered prior to the development of the 





This first approach to the computational modeling of 
mental simulation is far from being perfect or comprehen-
sive. However, it contributes with a reusable architecture 
and the implementation we chose shows that mental simu-
lation can be successfully implemented in a combat simu-
lation environment. We hope we have helped pave the 
way for adding expectations and imagination to better 
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